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Abstract
Anti-spoofing for automatic speaker verification is now a well
established area of research, with three competitive challenges
having been held in the last 6 years. A great deal of research
effort over this time has been invested into the development of
front-end representations tailored to the spoofing detection task.
One such approach known as constant Q cepstral coefficients
(CQCCs) have been shown to be especially effective in detect-
ing attacks implemented with a unit selection based speech syn-
thesis algorithm. Despite their success, they largely fail in de-
tecting other forms of spoofing attack where more traditional
front-end representations give substantially better results. Simi-
lar differences were also observed in the most recent, 2019 edi-
tion of the ASVspoof challenge series. This paper reports our
attempts to help explain these observations. The explanation is
shown to lie in the level of attention paid by each front-end to
different sub-band components of the spectrum. Thus far, sur-
prisingly little has been learned about what artefacts are being
detected by spoofing countermeasures. Our work hence aims
to shed light upon signal or spectrum level artefacts that serve
to distinguish different forms of spoofing attack from genuine,
bone fide speech. With a better understanding of these artefacts
we will be better positioned to design more reliable counter-
measures.
Keywords: spoofing, presentation attack detection, con-
stant Q cepstral coefficients, explainability
1. Introduction
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) technology is ubiquitous
nowadays, being applied to user authentication in an increas-
ingly diverse array of applications from smart-home technol-
ogy to telephone banking to health-sector applications [1, 2].
Despite its success, there are justified concerns surrounding the
vulnerabilities of ASV to spoofing, namely manipulation from
inputs specially crafted to deceive the system and provoke false
acceptances. The community has responded to this threat with
spoofing countermeasures that aim to detect and deflect such at-
tacks. The effort has been spearheaded through the ASVspoof
initiative which emerged from the first special event on the topic
held at INTERSPEECH in 2013 [3, 4].
The first edition of ASVspoof, held in 2015 [5], showed
that some voice conversion and speech synthesis spoofing at-
tacks can be detected with ease. The infamous S10 unit se-
lection speech synthesis algorithm,1 however, was shown to
present substantial difficulties. The constant Q cepstral coeffi-
cient (CQCC) front-end [6, 7], introduced subsequently in 2016,
was the first solution capable of detecting the S10 attack, reduc-
ing equal error rates (EERs) by some 72% relative to the state
1http://mary.dfki.de/
of the art at the time. While better performing solutions have
since emerged, the CQCC front-end remains popular. Over half
of ASVspoof 2019 participants (26 out of 48) used CQCC rep-
resentations as a component of their submission. This includes
a number of top-performing systems, e.g. [8, 9, 10, 11].
CQCC features are, however, not a silver bullet. Even if
near-to-zero EERs can be obtained for some attacks, for others
results are poor. Among those in the ASVspoof 2015 database,
for the S8 tensor-based approach to voice conversion [12],
EERs obtained using CQCCs are substantially higher than those
obtained with more conventional linear frequency cepstral co-
efficient (LFCC) features. These observations have led us to
ask ourselves why? What could account for these performance
differences and what can be learned from the explanation?
The answer lies in the artefacts that characterise spoofing
attacks for which each front-end excels. Artefacts are signa-
tures or tell tale signs in spoofed speech that are left behind by
voice conversion and speech synthesis algorithms. They hence
provide the means to distinguish between bona fide and spoofed
speech. While end-to-end deep learning architectures, which
operate directly upon the signal and which have the capacity to
identify such artefacts automatically, may diminish the need to
understand what makes one representation outperform another,
explainability is always an issue of scientific interest.
While we have learned a great deal about the vulnerabilities
of ASV to spoofing and the pattern recognition architectures
that function well in detecting spoofing attacks, we have prob-
ably learned surprising little about what characterises spoofing
attacks at the signal, spectrum or feature level. An understand-
ing at this level would surely place us in a better position to
design better performing countermeasures capable of detecting
a broader range of attacks with greater reliability. The same
understanding might also provide some assurance that the arte-
facts being detected are in fact indicative of spoofing attacks
rather than database collection and pre-processing procedures.
The work presented in this paper hence revisits CQCC fea-
tures and attempts to show why they are effective in detecting
some attacks but less effective in detecting others. In particular,
we are interested in shedding light upon what is being detected
in the signal, i.e. the artefacts that characterise a spoofing at-
tack. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents
a brief review of the CQCC front-end. Section 3 describes a
sub-band approach to examine where information relevant to
spoofing detection is located in the spectrum. Section 4 presents
countermeasure performance and sub-band analysis results for
the ASVspoof 2019 database. Section 5 describes the impact of
variable spectro-temporal resolution whereas Section 6 presents
additional experiments designed to validate our findings. A dis-
cussion of these is presented in Section 7, together with some
directions for future work.
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2. Constant Q cepstral coefficients
This section describes the motivation behind the development
of constant Q cepstral coefficients (CQCCs). It shows how
CQCC features are derived starting with the constant Q trans-
form (CQT), describes differences to spectro-temporal decom-
position with the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) and presents
comparative results for the ASVspoof 2015 database.
2.1. Motivation
One strategy to spoof an ASV system would be to generate and
present speech signals whose features match well those cor-
responding to genuine, bona fide speech produced by the tar-
get speaker (the identity being claimed by the attacker). In
this sense, the characteristics of a speech signal that distin-
guish different speakers are unlikely to be the same as those
that distinguish between bona fide and spoofed speech. These
assumptions provided the motivation behind the development
of CQCCs; instead of using features designed specifically for
ASV, a popular choice in the early years of anti-spoofing re-
search, we sought to use features that were fundamentally dif-
ferent to those designed for ASV. The fundamental assumption
was that, if the spoofer is trying to produce speech signals that
replicate the same features used for ASV, then features opti-
mised for ASV cannot be the best approach to detect spoofed
speech signals; features not optimised for ASV would have bet-
ter potential for spoofing detection since the spoofer was not
trying to produce speech signals which replicate these features.
Although it was discovered later that CQCCs were also useful
for other speech tasks including speaker diarization, ASV and
utterance verification [7, 13], they were not designed for ASV.
The inspiration for CQCCs came from prior experience of using
the constant Q transform (CQT) for music processing tasks [14].
2.2. From the CQT to CQCCs
The perceptually motivated CQT [15, 16] approach to the
spectro-temporal analysis of a discrete signal 𝑥(𝑛) is defined
by:
𝑋𝐶𝑄(𝑘, 𝑛) =
𝑛+⌊𝑁𝑘/2⌋∑︁
𝑙=𝑛−⌊𝑁𝑘/2⌋
𝑥(𝑗)𝑎*𝑘(𝑙 − 𝑛 + 𝑁𝑘/2) (1)
where 𝑛 is the sample index, 𝑘 = 1, 2, ...,𝐾 is the frequency
bin index, 𝑎𝑘(𝑛) are the basis functions, * is the complex con-
jugate and 𝑁𝑘 is the frame length. The basis functions 𝑎𝑘(𝑛)
are defined by:
𝑎𝑘(𝑛) = 𝑔𝑘(𝑛)𝑒
𝑗2𝜋𝑛𝑓𝑘/𝑓𝑠 , 𝑛 ∈ Z (2)
where 𝑔𝑘(𝑛) is zero-centred window function, 𝑓𝑘 is the cen-
ter of each frequency bin and 𝑓𝑠 is the sampling rate. Further
details are available in [14].
The center of each frequency bin 𝑓𝑘 is defined according
to where 𝑓1 is the center of the lowest frequency bin and 𝐵 is
the number of bins per octave. 𝐵 determines the trade-off be-
tween spectral and temporal resolutions. 𝑁𝑘 ∈ R in Eqs. 1
and 2 is real-valued and inversely proportional to 𝑓𝑘. As a re-
sult, the summation in Eq. 1 is over a number of samples that
is dependent upon the frequency. The spectro-temporal resolu-
tion is hence also dependent upon the frequency. The quality
(Q) factor, given by 𝑄 = 𝑓𝑘/𝛿𝑓 , where 𝛿𝑓 is the bandwidth,
reflects the selectivity of each filter in the filterbank. For the
CQT transform, Q is constant for all frequency bins 𝑘; filters
are logarithmically spaced.
The CQT gives 𝑋𝐶𝑄(𝑘, 𝑛) a geometrically spaced spec-
trum. This is resampled using a spline interpolation method
to a uniform, linear scale, giving ?¯?𝐶𝑄(𝑙, 𝑛) which attributes
equal weighting to information across the full spectrum [6].
CQCCs [6] are obtained from the discrete cosine transforma-
tion (DCT) of the logarithm of the squared-magnitude CQT as
follows:
𝐶𝑄𝐶𝐶(𝑝, 𝑛) =
𝐿−1∑︁
𝑙=0
log
⃒⃒⃒
?¯?𝐶𝑄(𝑙, 𝑛)
⃒⃒⃒2
cos
[︃
𝑝
(︀
𝑙 − 1
2
)︀
𝜋
𝐿
]︃
where 𝑝 = 0, 1, ..., 𝐿 − 1 and where 𝑙 is now the linear-scale
frequency bin index. Full details of the CQCC extraction algo-
rithm are available in [6]. Efficient implementations of the CQT
can be found in [14] and [17].
2.3. Differences to the DFT and LFCC
The principal differences between the CQT and the discrete
Fourier transform (DFT) relate to the spectro-temporal resolu-
tion. Whatever the algorithm, spectral decompositions essen-
tially act as a filterbank. For the DFT, the set of filterbank fre-
quencies are linearly distributed and the bandwidth of each fil-
ter is constant. For the DFT, Q is no longer constant, but is
linearly distributed. The series of filters is no longer logarith-
mically spaced, but linearly spaced. This ensures that the DFT
exhibits constant spectral resolution. This is not the case for the
CQT. Compared to the DFT and as a direct consequence of the
constant Q property, the CQT-derived spectrum has greater fre-
quency resolution at lower frequencies than at higher frequen-
cies. The CQT-derived spectrogram will then exhibit greater
temporal resolution at higher frequencies than at lower frequen-
cies.
2.4. Performance
Both CQCC and LFCC front-ends are typically used with sim-
ple Gaussian mixture model (GMM) classifiers. The perfor-
mance obtained with GMM-CQCC and GMM-LFCC systems
in terms of EER for the evaluation partition of the ASVspoof
2015 database is illustrated in Table 1, which reproduces results
from [6]. Results are shown independently for each of the 10
different attacks. Results for two attacks show marked differ-
ences for the CQCC and LFCC front-ends. These are S8, for
which LFCCs outperform CQCCs by 93% relative, and S10 for
which CQCCs outperform LFCCs by 87% relative. While the
motivation for our work stems from these two differences for
the ASVspoof 2015 database, results reported later in this paper
relate to the more recent ASVspoof 2019 database.
3. Sub-band analysis
The differences in the spectro-temporal resolution of the DFT
and CQT lead to one potential explanation for differences in
the performance of GMM-LFCC and GMM-CQCC systems.
This relates to differences in the spectral resolution at lower
frequencies and temporal resolution at higher frequencies. Put
differently, it might suggest that the artefacts that distinguish
spoofed speech from bona fide speech might reside in specific
sub-bands, rather than in the full band signal. This hypothesis
is supported by [18, 19, 20, 21] which all found this to be the
case for synthetic speech. Accordingly, we set out to determine
whether differences at the sub-band level could explain differ-
ences in the performance of LFCC and CQCC representations.
Table 1: EERs (%) for the ASVspoof 2015 database, evaluation partition. Results for GMM-CQCC and GMM-LFCC baseline
systems, reproduced from [6]. Results for two attacks (S8 and S10) show stark differences in performance for each system.
System S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10
GMM-CQCC 0.005 0.106 0.000 0.000 0.130 0.098 0.064 1.033 0.053 1.065
GMM-LFCC 0.027 0.408 0.000 0.000 0.114 0.149 0.011 0.074 0.027 8.185
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Figure 1: A 2-dimensional heatmap visualisation of sub-band
analysis results for an arbitrary spoofing attack. The horizontal
axis depicts the high-pass cut-in frequency 𝑓min whereas the
vertical axis depicts the low pass cut-off frequency 𝑓max. The
colour bar to the right of the plot depicts the EER obtained for
each band-pass filter configuration (pair of 𝑓min and 𝑓max).
Given the stark difference in temporal resolution at high fre-
quencies, our hypothesis has always been that this is where the
artefacts are located for attacks such as S10. The assumption is
that these artefacts are then only captured by using a spectro-
temporal decomposition with a higher temporal resolution.
3.1. Experiments
The set of experiments designed to test this hypothesis consist in
an extensive sub-band analysis whereby the GMM-LFCC and
GMM-CQCC classifiers are applied to the ASVspoof 2019 log-
ical access database at a sub-band level. In any single exper-
iment, the entire database is processed with a low-pass and/or
high-pass filter. With both low-pass and high-pass filters, the
result is a band-pass filter with cut-in 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 and cut-off 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥.
Corresponding GMM models are retrained each time. Cut-in
and cut-off frequencies are varied in steps of 400 Hz between
0 Hz and the sampling frequency of 8 kHz. The EER is then
determined in the usual manner [22].
3.2. Heatmap visualisation
Results are visualised in the form of a 2-dimensional heatmap,
an example of which is illustrated in Fig. 1. The horizontal
vertical axes of the heatmap signify the cut-in frequency 𝑓min
and cut-off frequency 𝑓max of the high-pass and low-pass fil-
ter respectively. For band-pass filters, 𝑓min < 𝑓max, hence the
triangular form. The EER corresponding to each band-pass fil-
ter configuration is indicated with the colour bar to the right of
Fig. 1, with blue colours indicating low EERs and red colours
indicating higher EERs.
The left-most column of the heatmap shows the EER for
a decreasingly aggressive low-pass filter, moving from bottom-
to-top. The top-most row of the heatmap shows the EER for
a increasingly aggressive high-pass filter moving from left-to-
right. Everywhere else corresponds to a band-pass filter, with
the full-band configuration being at the top-left. EERs along the
diagonal of Fig. 1 illustrate the benefit of spectrum information
at the sub-band level.
The heatmap serves as a crude means to evaluate which sub-
bands are the least and most informative in distinguishing be-
tween spoofed and bona fide speech. For the arbitrary example
illustrated in Fig. 1, EERs along the diagonal suggest that infor-
mation at lower frequencies is discriminative, whereas use of
that at higher frequencies is not sufficiently discriminative to be
used alone. EERs in the left-most column show that the most
discriminative information of all is contained at low frequen-
cies. So long as this information is used, then the EER is low.
EERs in the top-most row show that as soon as low frequency
information is discarded, then the EER increases. Information
between 1 and 3 kHz and above 7 kHz is non-discriminative.
That between 3 and 7 kHz is less discriminative, with reason-
able EERs being obtained only when the information in a suffi-
cient number of sub-bands is combined.
4. Experiments with the
ASVspoof 2019 database
Described here is our use of the ASVspoof 2019 database,
the specific configurations of GMM-LFCC and GMM-CQCC
spoofing countermeasures, the subset of spoofing attacks with
which this work was performed, and the results of sub-band
analysis.
4.1. Database and protocols
The ASVspoof 2019 database consist of two different protocols
based on logical access (LA) and physical access (PA) use case
scenarios [23]. The LA scenario relates to spoofing attacks per-
formed with voice conversion and speech synthesis algorithms
whereas the PA scenario involves exclusively replay spoofing
attacks. Since the work reported in this paper stems from ob-
servations made for spoofing attacks performed with voice con-
version and synthetic speech algorithms, our experiments were
performed with the LA dataset only.
All experiments were performed with the standard
ASVspoof 2019 protocols which consist of independent train,
development and, evaluation partitions. Spoofed speech in each
partition is generated using a set of voice conversion and speech
synthesis algorithms [24]. There are 19 different spoofing at-
tacks. Attacks in the training and development set were created
with a set of 6 algorithms (A01-A06), whereas those in the eval-
uation set were created with a set of 13 algorithms (A07-A19).
All experiments reported in this paper were performed with the
evaluation set only.
Table 2: EERs (%) for the ASVspoof 2019 logical access database, evaluation partition. Results for both baseline systems,
GMM-CQCC (linear scale), GMM-LFCC and GMM-CQCC (geometric scale). Results for GMM-CQCC (linear) and GMM-LFCC
reproduced from [23]. Results for six attacks (highlighted) show stark differences in performance for each system.
System A07 A08 A09 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 A16 A17 A18 A19
GMM-CQCC (linear) 0.00 0.04 0.14 15.16 0.08 4.74 26.15 10.85 1.26 0.00 19.62 3.81 0.04
GMM-LFCC 12.86 0.37 0.00 18.97 0.12 4.92 9.57 1.22 2.22 6.31 7.71 3.58 13.94
GMM-CQCC (geometric) 3.39 0.34 0.46 6.86 4.62 3.58 4.23 0.67 1.52 4.00 25.04 19.63 29.46
Table 3: A summary of the six spoofing attack algorithms (voice conversion and speech synthesis) from the ASVspoof 2019 logical
access database used in this work. * indicates neural networks. Full details for each algorithm can be found in [24].
Attack Input Input processor Duration Conversion Speaker represent. Outputs Waveform generator
A07 [25, 26] Text NLP RNN* RNN* One hot embed. MCC, F0, BA WORLD
A13 [27, 28] Speech (TTS) WORLD DTW Moment matching* - MCC Waveform filtering
A14 [29, 30] Speech (TTS) ASR* - RNN* - MCC, F0, BAP STRAIGHT
A16 [31] Text NLP - CART - MFCC, F0 Waveform concat.
A17 [32, 28] Speech (human) WORLD - VAE* One hot embed. MCC, F0 Waveform filtering
A19 Speech (human) LPCC/MFCC - GMM-UBM - LPC Spectral filtering + OLA
4.2. Countermeasures
Experiments were performed using the two spoofing counter-
measures that were distributed with the ASVspoof 2019 chal-
lenge database. They are the GMM-LFCC and GMM-CQCC
baseline systems2 [23]. The front-end representation used
by the GMM-LFCC system comprises 20 static, velocity (∆)
and acceleration (∆∆) LFCC coefficients, thereby giving 60-
dimension feature vectors. The 90-dimension GMM-CQCC
representation comprises 29 static with zero energy coefficient,
∆, ∆∆ coefficients. The back-end is common to both systems
and consists of a traditional GMM classifier with two models,
one for bona fide speech and one for spoofed speech, both with
512 models. Scores are conventional log-likelihood ratios. Nei-
ther countermeasure system was re-optimised; this work is not
concerned with optimisation. Results reported here are those
obtained with the original ASVspoof 2019 baseline counter-
measures as reported in [23].
4.3. Metric and performance
Even though it is not the primary metric for the ASVspoof 2019
database, performance is assessed in terms of the EER which
is determined according to a convex hull approach [22]. While
the community has moved towards use of the tandem detec-
tion cost function (t-DCF) metric [33], the primary metric for
the ASVspoof 2019 database, the work reported in this paper is
concerned exclusively with countermeasure performance rather
than the impact of spoofing and countermeasures upon ASV
performance. The latter is a related, but different issue. Use of
the EER is then appropriate and sufficient for this purposes of
the work presented in this paper.
EER results for the two countermeasures and the evaluation
partition of the ASVspoof 2019 LA database are illustrated in
Table 2. Just as is the case for the 2015 database, results for
the 2019 database show substantial variations in performance
for the GMM-LFCC and GMM-CQCC countermeasures. For
attacks A07, A16 and A19, the GMM-CQCC system outper-
forms GMM-LFCC system whereas, for attacks A13, A14 and
A17, it is the GMM-LFCC system that performs best, albeit still
with relatively high error rates.
2https://www.asvspoof.org/asvspoof2019/
asvspoof2019_evaluation_plan.pdf
Subsequent experiments were performed separately for this
subset of 6 specific spoofing attacks, all being examples of
where one front-end representation leads to substantially bet-
ter results than the other. Brief details of the specific algorithms
used in creating each attack are illustrated in Table 3. There
are four voice conversion algorithms (A13, A14, A17 and A19)
and two speech synthesis algorithms (A07 and A16), even if the
input to two of the voice conversion algorithms is also synthetic
speech (A13 and A14). Further details of each algorithm are
available in [24].
4.4. Sub-band analyses
We sought to explain differences in the performance of GMM-
LFCC and GMM-CQCC systems using what we could learn
from sub-band analysis, results for which are shown in Fig. 2.
Heatmaps are shown for each of the 6 spoofing attacks: A07,
A16, A19 for which the GMM-CQCC system performs best;
A13, A14 and A17 for which the GMM-LFCC system performs
best. Results for the GMM-CQCC and GMM-LFCC systems
are illustrated in rows one and two respectively. In each case,
the EER for the baseline system is denoted by the top-left-most
point in each 2D heatmap, i.e. the full-band case.
Figs. 2 (a)-(c) show that the baseline GMM-CQCC system
(top-left-most point) gives low EERs whereas Figs. 2 (g)-(i)
show that the GMM-LFCC system gives consistently worse re-
sults. Figs. 2 (d)-(f) and (j)-(l) show the opposite, even if per-
formance for A17 (l) is still poor for both the baseline systems.
Upon inspection of heatmaps for both LFCC and CQCC front-
ends, we see that the critical information for the detection of all
three attacks lies at high frequencies. While it is not visible in
the plots at this scale, the discriminative information lies above
7.6 kHz; near-to-zero EERs can be obtained using information
between 7.6 and 8 kHz only, using either front-end.
The situation for attacks A13, A14 and A17 is a little dif-
ferent. The diagonals of the heatmaps in Figs. 2 (d), (e), (j)
and (k) all suggest that the most informative information is at
the lower frequencies. The left-most columns of Figs. 2 (d), (e)
and (j) suggest that the most critical information is located at
the very lowest sub-bands. For A17, neither front-end performs
especially well. The CQCC front-end fails completely, whereas
the LFCC front-end succeeds in capturing information across
the majority of the full band.
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Figure 2: 2-D heatmap visualisations of sub-band analysis results for the six different spoof attacks. The first row (a-f) shows results
for the GMM-CQCC (linear) system. The second row (g-l) shows corresponding results for the GMM-LFCC system. The third row
(m-r) shows results for the GMM-CQCC (geometric) system.
5. Spectro-temporal resolution
Results presented above dispel somewhat the hypothesis that
CQCCs produces better results than LFCCs for some attacks on
account of the higher temporal resolution at high frequencies.
If this were true, reliable performance would not have been ob-
tained with the LFCC front-end using high frequency sub-bands
alone. The explanation lies elsewhere.
The same results show that the discriminative information
simply lies in the highest sub-bands; with appropriate band-pass
filtering, both front-ends perform well for A07, A16 and A19
attacks. It is more than this, though, since such a straightfor-
ward explanation does not account for why the original, full-
band CQCC front-end performs well, i.e. without band-pass fil-
tering. The explanation for this observation requires us to revisit
the issue of spectro-temporal resolution.
Fig. 3 illustrates a set of DFT and CQT-derived spectra for
an arbitrary speech frame. Each plot also shows the second ba-
sis function of the DCT used in cepstral analysis. The vertical
bars serve to illustrate the spectral resolution across the spec-
trum and give some indication of the temporal resolution, which
is inversely proportional to the spectral resolution.
The top plot in Fig. 3 shows the CQT-derived spectrum
(without re-sampling) [34]. It shows clearly that the spectral
resolution is higher at lower frequencies than at higher frequen-
cies. The DCT basis function in this plot is warped to the
same, non-linear frequency scale. The second plot shows ex-
actly the same data, now plotted with a logarithmic frequency
scale, hence the regularity of the vertical bars and DCT basis
function. These plots show how, without resampling, the DCT
will attribute greater weight to the low frequency components
than to high frequency components. The third plot shows the
CQT-derived spectrum after resampling. The the vertical bars
show how resampling acts to linearise the rate of sampling in
the frequency domain. Note the difference in frequency scales
for the second and third plots. The higher spectral resolution
(and hence lower temporal resolution) for lower frequencies is
still clearly apparent; the spectrum is much smoother at higher
frequencies.
A comparison of the cosine basis functions to the CQT-
derived spectra in the second and third plots shows that re-
sampling acts to dilute (weaken) information at lower frequen-
cies but to distil (emphasise) information at higher frequencies.
Hence, spoofing artefacts at high frequencies are emphasised by
the CQCC front-end.
The fourth plot of Fig. 3 shows the DFT-derived spectrum
and the linear sampling in the frequency domain. Here, the DCT
acts to weight all frequency components uniformly. Spoofing
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Figure 3: Illustrations of spectra for an arbitrary speech frame derived using the CQT and DFT (blue) and the second basis function of
the discrete cosine transform used in cepstral analysis (black). The top plot shows the CQT-derived spectrum without resampling,
hence the logarithmic sampling (compression of vertical blue lines) in the linear frequency domain. The second plot shows the same
spectrum but with a warped, logarithmic frequency scale. The third plot shows the CQT-derived spectrum after resampling to a
uniform, linear frequency scale (Section 2; thus more vertical lines). The forth plot shows the corresponding DFT-derived spectrum.
artefacts at high frequencies are not emphasised; reliable per-
formance is then obtained only by band-pass filtering.
The explanation for why the LFCC front-end outperforms
the CQCC front-end for attacks A13, A14 and A17 is now
straightforward. The artefacts for these attacks are at lower and
mid-range frequencies where the CQT acts to dilute informa-
tion, hency why the GMM-CQCC system performs poorly for
these attacks. Since the DFT gives uniform weighting to infor-
mation at all frequencies, the GMM-LFCC system gives better,
though still somewhat poor performance. This is because infor-
mation at low frequencies is not emphasised.
6. Validation
We designed one final experiment to validate our findings. The
CQT-derived spectra in the top two plots of Fig. 3 show dense
sampling of the spectrum at lower frequencies but sparse sam-
pling at higher frequencies. Hence, without resampling, the ap-
plication of cepstral analysis should result in the emphasis of
information situated at lower frequencies. In this case, a CQCC
front-end without linear resampling should produce better de-
tection performance in the case of attacks A13 and A14. Perfor-
mance for attack A17 might not be improved, since the artefacts
appear not to be localised at low frequencies.
We repeated the sub-band analysis described in Section 3
using the geometrically-scaled CQCC front-end. Results are il-
lustrated in Figs. 2 (m)-(r) for the same set of 6 attacks for which
results are described in Section 4. The comparison of the right-
most columns in the heatmaps of Figs. 2 (d) and (p) and those
in (e) and (q) clearly show that lower EERs are obtained using
the geometrically-scaled rather than the linearly-scaled CQCC
front-end. Low EERs are even obtained when the front-end is
applied without any band-pass filtering. This is because use of
the original CQT geometric frequency scale results in the em-
phasis of information at lower frequencies where the artefacts
are located. As expected, attack A17 remains troublesome.
EERs for the geometrically-scaled CQCC front-end are pre-
sented in the last row of Table 2. For some attacks, the EER for
the geometrically-scaled CQCC front-end is slightly higher. For
some others, it is slightly lower. Once again, performance for
A17 is poor, and even worse than for both the linearly-scaled
CQCC and LFCC front-ends. Those for A13 and A14 clearly
confirm our findings, with substantially lower EERs than those
obtained with both the linearly-scaled CQCC and LFCC front-
ends. Use of the original geometric scale of the CQT clearly re-
sults in the emphasis of information at lower frequencies where
the artefacts are localised.
7. Discussion
This paper reports an explainability study of constant Q cepstral
coefficients (CQCCs), a spoofing countermeasure front-end for
automatic speaker verification [6, 7]. The work aims to ex-
plain why the CQCC front-end works so reliably in detecting
some forms of spoofing attack, but performs poorly in detecting
others. It confirms that different spoofing attacks exhibit arte-
facts at different frequencies, artefacts that are better captured
with specific front-ends. The standard constant Q transform
(CQT) [15, 16] exhibits a dense sampling of the spectrum at
lower frequencies and a sparse sampling at higher frequencies.
Hence, geometrically-sampled CQCCs perform well in detect-
ing spoofing artefacts when they are located at low frequencies.
Linear sampling shifts the emphasis to higher frequencies so
that the detection of spoofing artefacts at high frequencies are
emphasised and captured reliably.
Taken together, the results presented in this paper show that
no single CQCC front-end configuration can perform well for
all spoofing attacks; different spoofing attacks produce artefacts
at different parts of the spectrum and these can only be detected
reliably when the front-end emphasises information in the rele-
vant frequency bands. This finding may explain why classifier
fusion has proven to be so important to generalisation, i.e. reli-
able performance in the face of varying spoofing attacks. Given
that spoofing artefacts can be highly localised in the spectrum,
the same finding suggests that we may need to rethink the use
of cepstral analysis, which acts to smooth information located
across the full spectrum. Approaches to detect localised arte-
facts need further investigation for multiple applications (the
EER represents just one operating point). We may then need
to rethink the approach to classifier fusion too.
One natural extension of the work would be to look deeper
into the artefacts themselves. Preliminary investigations show
that those at high frequencies appear to be nothing more than
band-limiting effects introduced by the spoofing algorithms, or
the data used in their training. The source of those at lower fre-
quencies are less clear. A clearer understanding of the artefacts
at the signal level, rather than just the feature or spectrum level
is certainly needed. This could help us to design better spoof-
ing countermeasures, even if the same understanding might also
help the fraudsters to design better spoofing attacks.
Lastly, while it was not the objective of this work to investi-
gate the generalisation capabilities of the CQCC front-end, it is
clear that none of the countermeasures for which results are re-
ported in this paper is successful in detecting all of the spoofing
attacks used in the creation of the ASVspoof 2019 database. At-
tacks A10, A12, A13, A17 and A18 are all examples where nei-
ther configuration of the CQCC front-end, nor the LFCC front-
end are especially effective. The work presented in this paper
focused on countermeasure performance exclusively. It did not
consider the effect of spoofing and countermeasures upon auto-
matic speaker verification (ASV) performance. Some attacks,
e.g. A17, are known not to be especially effective in fooling
ASV, and in this sense they pose no threat; that countermea-
sures fail to detect such attacks is hence of no serious concern.
Other attacks, though, are effective in manipulating ASV and
are also difficult to detect reliably. Other work reported by the
community has shown far better results than those reported in
this paper [8, 9, 10, 11]. Still, even the very best approaches
can be vulnerable to certain, specific attacks. The silver bullet
remains elusive for the time being.
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